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Multinational taxation is an area of research that encompasses academics in accounting, finance and
economics. In particular, researchers are interested in determining whether taxation alters where
multinational corporations (MNCs) operate their businesses. A review of the literature on foreign direct
investment provides clear support for taxes influencing MNCs' location decisions. In addition, MNCs appear
to organize themselves in a manner to increase the amount of their profitsinvested in relatively lightly taxed
jurisdictions. By altering the location and the character of income across jurisdictions, MNCs are able to
reduce their tax burdens. The natural extension of these lines of research, then, is determining the welfare
consequences of MNCs' sensitivity to taxation.
This review aggregates the large body of international tax literature succinctly in one location. Very little of
what is incorporated in this piece is novel. Rather, it borrows heavily from those researchers who have focused
their careers on understanding taxation in the multinational context. Unfortunately, because the research in
this area is dominated by work involving U.S. data, the review is also quite U.S.-centric. However, many
countries' multinational tax rules are quite similar. This is primarily attributable to the conformity generated in
tax treaties based on the model treaty outlined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). So, although there is variation in specific tax rules across jurisdictions, the basic tax
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Abstract
Multinational taxation is an area of research that encompasses aca-
demics in accounting, ﬁnance and economics. In particular, researchers
are interested in determining whether taxation alters where multina-
tional corporations (MNCs) operate their businesses. A review of the
literature on foreign direct investment provides clear support for taxes
inﬂuencing MNCs’ location decisions. In addition, MNCs appear to
organize themselves in a manner to increase the amount of their prof-
its invested in relatively lightly taxed jurisdictions. By altering the
location and the character of income across jurisdictions, MNCs are
able to reduce their tax burdens. The natural extension of these lines
of research, then, is determining the welfare consequences of MNCs’
sensitivity to taxation.
This review aggregates the large body of international tax litera-
ture succinctly in one location. Very little of what is incorporated in
this piece is novel. Rather, it borrows heavily from those researchers
who have focused their careers on understanding taxation in the multi-
national context. Unfortunately, because the research in this area is
dominated by work involving U.S. data, the review is also quite U.S.-
centric. However, many countries’ multinational tax rules are quite sim-
ilar. This is primarily attributable to the conformity generated in tax
treaties based on the model treaty outlined by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). So, although there
is variation in speciﬁc tax rules across jurisdictions, the basic tax rules
are very homogeneous.
1
Introduction
Multinational taxation is an area of research that encompasses aca-
demics in accounting, ﬁnance and economics. Over the years, these
researchers have endeavored to understand the role of taxation on
multinational corporation (“MNC”) behavior. In particular, researchers
are interested in determining whether taxation alters where MNCs’
operate their businesses. A review of the literature on foreign direct
investment provides clear support for taxes inﬂuencing MNCs’ loca-
tion decisions. In addition, MNCs appear to organize themselves in
a manner to increase the amount of their proﬁts invested in relatively
lightly taxed jurisdictions. By altering the location and the character of
income across jurisdictions, MNCs are able to reduce their tax burdens.
The natural extension of these lines of research, then, is determining the
welfare consequences of MNCs’ sensitivity to taxation. Ceteris paribus,
investors are better oﬀ if an MNC can lower its worldwide tax burden.
Yet, the revenue consequences to the jurisdictions involved are far less
clear.
The central problem of multinational taxation is that there are at
least two jurisdictions that can claim the right to tax the ﬁrm’s income.
Firms that only operate within the conﬁnes of one jurisdiction face one
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set of statutory tax rates. Firms that operate in several jurisdictions are
not only subject to several sets of tax rates but also several sets of tax
regulations. The interplay between rules and rates leads to a multitude
of potential tax obligations facing these ﬁrms. As the income of multina-
tional corporations faces overlapping tax claims, MNCs have developed
various avenues for tax avoidance which complicates tax collection by
the tax authorities. Such tax-avoiding behavior may reduce tax revenue
and could distort international ﬁnancial ﬂows and the international
allocation of investment by MNCs. An important policy question is
to what extent these incentives for tax avoidance actually aﬀect the
behavior of MNCs and reduces tax revenue.
Governments also have been known to use the tax system to both
attract foreign investment and acquire leverage over MNCs’ that they
believe are unfairly escaping taxation in their jurisdiction. Hence,
there are often competing incentives that lead to conﬂicting objectives
between an MNC’s home country and the countries where they do busi-
ness. Further, many countries are broadly deﬁned to be tax havens.
A tax haven can be any country that reduces its statutory tax rates
to attract foreign investment. Not only does a relatively low tax rate
potentially attract investment, it also likely increases the incentives for
a ﬁrm operating in a nearby high-tax jurisdiction to shift its proﬁts out
of the high-tax jurisdiction into its low-tax neighbor. Many legislators
argue that havens are bad for the U.S. But if a U.S. MNC reduces its
foreign tax burden, then, as described below, it is eﬀectively increas-
ing its domestic tax burden. Furthermore, the U.S. and the U.K. are
known to be particularly astute in pursuing taxpayers who appear to
be aggressively undertaking income shifting to low-tax jurisdictions.
Eventually, much of the discussion herein will (hopefully) become
obsolete as countries continue to conform their tax regimes. As dis-
cussed in detail below, there are two basic tax regimes facing multi-
national ﬁrms: a territorial system, and a worldwide system. Under a
territorial system, proﬁts are subject to taxation based on where they
are earned regardless of where the ultimate owner (or parent) of the
ﬁrm resides. Worldwide taxation, on the other hand, subjects all proﬁts
to taxation in the parent’s home country. At the writing of the review,
the U.S. is the sole member of the G7 with a worldwide system of
5taxation and corporate tax rate in excess of 30%. Both Japan and the
U.K. adopted territorial tax systems in 2009. Now, over three quarters
of the member nations of the Organization for Economic Coordination
and Development (OECD) have adopted a territorial system of taxa-
tion. The fact that U.S. MNCs not only face a worldwide system of
taxation but also a very high statutory tax rate leads many to believe
that U.S. ﬁrms are at a relative disadvantage as compared to their
non-U.S.-domiciled competitors.
The role of this review is to aggregate the large body of international
tax literature succinctly in one location. Very little of what is incor-
porated in this piece is novel. Rather, it borrows heavily from those
researchers who have focused their careers on understanding taxation
in the multinational context. Unfortunately, because the research in
this area is dominated by work involving U.S. data, the review is also
quite U.S.-centric.
However, many countries’ multinational tax rules are quite simi-
lar. This is primarily attributable to the conformity generated in tax
treaties based on the model treaty outlined by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). So, although there
is variation in speciﬁc tax rules across jurisdictions, the basic tax rules
are very homogeneous.
Much of the prior non-U.S. research used the cross-sectional vari-
ation in countries’ tax rates to garner variation in other jurisdictions’
dividend taxation systems to study the role of shareholder level taxes
on payout policy and share prices (e.g., Lasfer, 2008). However, there
has been a recent uptick in studies involving non-U.S. corporate data.
Because of the availability of Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis, Amadeus and
the Bundesbanks’ datasets, researchers have begun to investigate the
role of cross-border taxation on merger and acquisition activity (e.g.,
Huizinga and Voget, 2009) as well as intra-ﬁrm capital structure (e.g.,
Huizinga et al., 2008). I look forward to reading more of this work in
the future.
I begin by outlining all of the (relatively) picky details of taxing
multinational ﬁrms in Section 2. My focus, due to the limits of
my knowledge, is on the U.S. tax regime. As the very notion of
multinational implies more than one regime, the consequences of other
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jurisdictions’ tax regimes are also important but, for simplicity, are pre-
sumed to merely be diﬀerent than that of the U.S. In Section 3 of this
review, I will discuss the theory and the related research on the role
of taxation on foreign direct investment and remittances of proﬁts into
the home country. The incentives to undertake income shifting and/or
transfer pricing will be described in Section 4. Then, in Section 5, I will
address some of the non-tax considerations (including ﬁnancial account-
ing) of foreign investment decisions. I discuss some current develop-
ments in the multinational tax policy in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2
U.S. Taxation of Multinational Corporations
2.1 Overview
U.S. corporations earn a substantial portion of their income from for-
eign sources. In 1986, the net foreign-source income reported by U.S.
corporations on their U.S tax returns was over $140 billion, which
amounted to over 52% of their total net income. As Figure 2.1 shows,
over the past two decades, foreign source income of the S&P500 has
grown from 32% to 50% of ﬁrms’ total pre-tax income. At the same
time, the proportion of these ﬁrms’ U.S. tax expense as a percentage
of total pre-tax income has declined from 18% to 8%. This ﬁnding has
led many to believe that there has been an erosion of the U.S. tax base
because multinational ﬁrms are either shifting income out of the U.S.
or forgoing U.S. domestic investment for investment in low-tax foreign
jurisdictions.
In order to understand any potential welfare implications of tax
planning, it is ﬁrst necessary to understand how the U.S. taxes multina-
tional ﬁrms. The U.S. eﬀectively taxes based on the residence principle.
Basically, if a company is incorporated in the U.S. then that company
and all of its downstream subsidiaries (or aﬃliates) are taxed on their
7
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Fig. 2.1 S&P 500 ﬁrms percent of pre-tax income reported as foreign-sourced and federal
eﬀective tax rates.
This graph provides the ratio of aggregate foreign pre-tax income (Compustat PIFO) over
the sum of domestic and foreign pre-tax income (Compustat PIFO+Compustat PIDOM).
Federal eﬀective tax rate is federal tax expense (TXFED) over the sum of domestic and
foreign pre-tax income. Negative values of PIFO and PIDOM are set to zero.
worldwide income. The other predominant tax system, territorial, taxes
ﬁrms based on the source of their income.
As the U.S. taxes the worldwide income of U.S.-domiciled corpora-
tions, when a U.S. multinational earns foreign source income, both the
U.S. and the countries where this income is generated assert the right
to tax the income. The U.S. generally does not tax the foreign source
income until the income is remitted (or repatriated) back to the U.S.,
typically in the form of a dividend. If foreign income is reinvested in the
foreign business, then taxation of the foreign source income is deferred
until repatriation. To prevent double taxation, the U.S. allows a credit
against any U.S. tax obligation for the foreign taxes already paid on
the foreign source income.
Territorial countries generally only tax the income generated within
their borders. Unlike the worldwide system, any active business income
earned outside of a territorial country’s borders is not taxed by the
MNCs’ home jurisdiction. For both the territorial and the worldwide
systems, the income’s source country is the ﬁrst to tax the proﬁts.
The source country may also levy withholding taxes on remittances
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of income out of the country in the form of dividends, interest, rents,
management fees and royalties.
2.2 Deferral
Deferral is a very important component of the worldwide tax system.
By deferring taxation until income is distributed by the foreign sub-
sidiary to its parent, worldwide ﬁrms are better able to compete in the
global economy. However, the availability of deferral is contingent on
the way the foreign operations of the U.S. MNC are organized. If they
are organized as a branch of the U.S. MNC (i.e., not a separate legal
entity), then deferral is not provided and the U.S. immediately taxes
the foreign proﬁts — regardless of whether any proﬁts are remitted back
to the U.S. Outside of banking and insurance, branches are rare. If the
foreign operations are organized as a separate corporate aﬃliate, then
the foreign proﬁts are generally not taxed until they are remitted to the
U.S. parent. Because of deferral, multinational corporations generally
establish controlled foreign corporate subsidiaries (controlled foreign
corporations or CFCs) to conduct foreign operations.1 These corpora-
tions are governed by the laws of the host country in which they are
located.
The U.S. recognizes that deferral provides MNCs an incentive to
accumulate proﬁts in low-tax jurisdictions rather than repatriate them
to the U.S. To prevent ﬁrms from permanently avoiding the incre-
mental U.S. tax due on unremitted foreign earnings, the government
implemented Subpart F, which restricts deferral treatment on certain
types of foreign source income. The Subpart F provisions only apply
to income generated on passive assets. For example, interest, royalties,
dividends, security gains, and rents often constitute passive income
under Subpart F.
The U.S views passive income as stemming from avoidance tech-
niques generated from U.S. MNCs’ incentive to continue to defer taxa-
tion of income as long as possible. Due to integrated capital markets and
1 In the U.S., a CFC is an entity which is 50% or more owned by U.S. shareholders. A U.S.
shareholder for purposes of the CFC designation is any person (individual or entity) who
owns 10% or more of the foreign corporation.
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the highly mobile nature of the capital generating this type of income,
ﬁrms could generate similar returns in the U.S as abroad.2 But with
lower tax rates available abroad, U.S. MNCs are incentivized to leave
capital abroad which can then be lent to high-tax jurisdictions (such
as the U.S.). Because of the potential for abuse, the Subpart F rules
focus on taxing passive income between related parties. Finally, there
are a series of di minimus tests to prevent ﬁrms from having undue
compliance burdens by generating relatively low levels of Subpart F
income (e.g., interest on a bank account).
The Subpart F rules were adopted by the Kennedy Administration
(Revenue Act of 1962) as a method to mitigate the perceived erosion
of the U.S. tax base as U.S. MNCs expanded their overseas operations
(Redmiles and Wenrich, 2007). The tax legislation introduced in 1975
reduced the di minimus thresholds but otherwise the Subpart F rules
have been substantially unaltered since their adoption. Prior to 1997,
ﬁrms had diﬃculties setting up ﬁnancing aﬃliates without triggering
Subpart F income. However, the “check-the-box” regulations outlined
in Treasury Decision 8697, which allows single member LLCs for tax
purposes, alleviates many of ﬁrms’ Subpart F troubles. Because single
owner LLCs are disregarded entities for income tax purposes (though
recognized entities for legal purposes), any interest income received by
an LLC from its the foreign aﬃliate will be considered as belonging to
the owning aﬃliate thereby skirting the Subpart F rules by qualifying
for the di minimus thresholds (Altshuler and Grubert, 2008).
2.3 Foreign Tax Credit
The foreign tax credit reduces the possibility that foreign-source income
could be taxed twice by allowing a credit against U.S taxes for taxes
levied by the foreign aﬃliate’s country (i.e., the income’s source coun-
try). The foreign tax credit has two components. The ﬁrst, called the
direct credit, is a credit for foreign taxes paid directly on the income
as it is received by the U.S. parent. Foreign taxes eligible for the direct
credit include withholding taxes on remittances to the U.S. parent,
2Note that if the ﬁrms’ primary business generates passive income (i.e., banking), then the
passive-type income will not constitute Subpart F income.
2.3 Foreign Tax Credit 11
such as dividend, interest, and royalties, and also income taxes on for-
eign branch operations. The second component, called the indirect, or
deemed-paid, credit is a credit for foreign income taxes paid on the
income distributed to the U.S. parent. The deemed-paid credit is avail-
able to a CFC’s U.S. corporate shareholders who own at least 10% of
the voting stock of the foreign corporation.
In the U.S., a worldwide limitation is used to calculate foreign tax
credits. The foreign tax credit limitation is determined as follows:
(Foreign-source income/worldwide income) ×U.S. tax on worldwide
income.
The actual foreign tax credit is the minimum of the foreign taxes
paid on the foreign source income or the foreign tax limitation as
described above. Therefore, if the foreign tax rate facing the foreign
aﬃliate is less than the U.S. tax rate, there will be an incremental tax
liability due on the repatriation of foreign earnings. In this case, the
U.S. parent is said to be in an excess limit position. On the other hand,
if the earnings were taxed at a higher rate in the foreign jurisdiction,
the U.S. parent will not have any tax obligation due upon repatriation.
The U.S. parent in these cases is said to be in an excess credit position.
As noted above, the U.S. allows MNCs to estimate the foreign tax
credit limitation based on aggregate foreign source income. This means
that ﬁrms are able to oﬀset excess credits from high-tax jurisdictions
with excess limits from low-tax jurisdictions. This cross-crediting can
take three forms. (1) U.S. MNCs can cross-credit by simultaneously
receiving dividend remittances from aﬃliates in high-tax and low-tax
countries. (2) If diﬀerent types of income are taxed disparately, an MNC
can cross-credit between income types (e.g., dividends as compared to
royalties). (3) Cross-crediting can occur over time using foreign tax
credit carryovers.
To prevent abuse, the FTC computation is also calculated
separately for two baskets of income. The U.S. limits cross-crediting
potential between passive (Subpart F) income and active income by
requiring a separate FTC limit calculation for each category. The bas-
kets eﬀectively make Subpart F more costly. As Subpart F income
is often generated in low-tax jurisdictions, the basket rules limit the
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ability of the ﬁrm to use repatriations from active income in high-tax
jurisdictions from oﬀsetting the tax obligation created by the passive
income generated in the low-tax jurisdiction.
As discussed in Redmiles and Wenrich (2007), there has been signif-
icant variation in the FTC rules over time. When the corporate income
tax was ﬁrst adopted, the U.S. mitigated double taxation by allowing
U.S. MNCs to deduct the income taxes paid to foreign jurisdictions.3
Since the cost of World War I forced foreign countries to increase their
income tax rates, the U.S. implemented the FTC to better prevent
double taxation. Initially, the U.S. allowed ﬁrms to oﬀset any amount
of their U.S. tax obligation with FTCs. Then, in 1921, the U.S. lim-
ited the FTC to the maximum of the U.S. tax that would have been
assessed on the foreign income. In 1958, the U.S. added provisions to
allow for the FTC carryback and carryforward (i.e., credit was eligible
for a ﬁve-year carryforward and a two-year carryback period).
The U.S. has often considered requiring ﬁrms to compute the FTC
on a country-by-country basis rather than a worldwide basis. Yet, legis-
lation requiring country-by-country measurement has never passed. In
addition, the number of separate limitation baskets has varied substan-
tially. Prior to 1986, the FTC calculation included ﬁve income baskets.
TRA 1986 increased the number of baskets to nine. The current two
baskets have been applicable since 2007 (created in legislation enacted
under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 or AJCA). The AJCA
also decreased the FTC carryback period to 1 year and increased the
carryforward period to 10 years.
Finally, the FTC is currently calculated on a last-in-ﬁrst-out (LIFO)
basis. This means that any dividend and the related tax credit ﬁrst
come from the current period’s taxable income. To the extent that the
3Taxpayers prefer receiving a credit for foreign taxes rather than a deduction, even if the
foreign tax rate exceeds the U.S. rate. To see this, denote foreign source income as FSI,
the U.S. tax rate as tus, and the foreign tax rate as tf . With a deduction for foreign income
taxes, the U.S. tax on FSI is tus(1 − tf)FSI, whereas with a credit the residual U.S. tax is
(tus − tf)FSI. From these formulas, notice that if foreign income taxes are deducted, the
rate of U.S. tax on the income would equal tus(1 − tf), which always exceeds the rate of
residual U.S. tax after the foreign tax credit, (tus − tf). If tf is greater than tus, there is
no residual U.S. tax after the credit, but a U.S. tax payment would still be required if the
foreign income taxes were simply deducted.
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dividend exceeds the current period’s earnings, the dividend is then
presumed to come from the aggregate pool of earnings using the average
tax rate of the aggregate pool. By pooling all past earnings and taxes
paid on those earnings, an MNC has very little ﬂexibility in managing
the foreign tax credit obligation on any particular dividend from a
given aﬃliate.4 Yet, MNCs have substantial ﬂexibility in cross-crediting
across diﬀerent aﬃliates.
4This aggregate pool actually only pertains to the period 1987 and forward. For dividends
paid from pre-1987 earnings and proﬁts, there is a separate yearly calculation on a LIFO
basis.
3
Role of Taxation on Investment and
Repatriation Decisions
3.1 Investment
As ﬁrms become more global, there has been an increased interest in
understanding the role of taxation on the cross-border ﬂows of capital
and income. Due to the impact on social welfare, there are enormous
policy implications to the mobility of capital. Academics and policy
makers alike have been involved in studying the speciﬁc impact of tax-
ation on the location decisions of MNCs.
3.1.1 Theory
To understand how tax policy aﬀects ﬁrms’ investment, it is helpful to
explore the theoretical literature. I begin by explaining the economic
consequences of the territorial and worldwide tax systems. A pure terri-
torial tax system provides capital import neutrality (CIN), whereby all
investment is taxed identically regardless of the source of the capital.
So, a Swedish ﬁrm investing in Sweden will face the same after-tax rate
of return as an Italian ﬁrm making the identical Swedish investment.
A pure worldwide system, on the other hand, provides capital export
neutrality (CEN). CEN means that ﬁrms will face the same tax rate
on investment regardless of where it is located. So, a U.S. ﬁrm faces
14
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a 35% tax rate regardless of whether it invests in the U.S. or in the
Netherlands.
The relative merits of CIN versus CEN have been argued for
decades. It is hard to draw inferences from any empirical work on
the topic because (as far as I am aware), there are no countries that
face either a pure territorial or worldwide system. Figure 3.1 lists the
OECD’s territorial countries and the limitations or constraints that
these countries place on dividend exemption. For example, Canada is
deemed territorial but only with countries with which it has treaties.
Belgium, on the other hand, requires investment to be in non-haven
jurisdictions before it exempts foreign earnings from taxation.
The presence of deferral in a worldwide system leads to the violation
of CEN. As ﬁrms are able to defer the incremental tax assessed by the
home jurisdiction until repatriation, ﬁrms have incentives to invest in
low-tax jurisdictions until repatriation is imminent.1 In terms of passive
income, the U.S.’s acceleration of taxation under Subpart F moves the
U.S. system closer to pure CEN. Whereas territorial countries, who
often exclude passive income from the territorial taxation, are moving
themselves away from CIN.
Recognizing that the U.S. uses a hybrid system, it is useful to
understand how its system aﬀects investment and subsequent repa-
triation. Hartman (1985) argued that, under a credit and deferral tax
system, the repatriation tax on foreign-source income is irrelevant to the
investment and dividend payment decisions of foreign aﬃliates that are
ﬁnanced through retained earnings (“mature” aﬃliates). However, he
points out that for an immature aﬃliate (i.e., an aﬃliate that required
external capital to ﬁnance its investment), the presence of repatria-
tion taxes inﬂuences the level of initial capital. Therefore, the greater
the anticipated repatriation taxes, the lower the initial foreign direct
investment.
When Hartman began his seminal work on the role of world-
wide taxation on investment and repatriation decisions, the common
1For ﬁrms with excess tax credits, the ability of U.S. ﬁrms to cross-credit the foreign taxes
paid in a high-tax jurisdiction on the tax liability created from a low-tax jurisdiction,
may violate CEN because investment in the low-tax jurisdiction will be tax-favored over
investment in the U.S. or in high-tax countries.
16 Role of Taxation on Investment and Repatriation Decisions
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assumption in the theoretical models was that foreign aﬃliates face
a ﬁxed dividend payout schedule (see Horst, 1977). This meant that
domestic parents of U.S. MNCs were contributing capital to their for-
eign aﬃliates and the aﬃliates were simultaneously issuing dividends
to their domestic parents. The ﬁxed payout assumption was in place in
order for ﬁrms to maintain their optimal capital structure and, hence,
minimize agency concerns. Hartman pointed out that because a parent-
controlled aﬃliate was unlikely to be suﬀering from agency concerns,
it was unlikely that the aﬃliate required the “discipline of debt”. So,
simultaneously contributing equity and paying dividends (“roundtrip-
ping funds”) only creates additional tax costs.
As Hartman explains, the decision to invest abroad can be expressed
as a function of foreign and domestic tax rates and risk-adjusted
after-tax returns. In a world with market imperfections, expected risk-
adjusted returns can vary across countries. To illustrate, I assume that
the foreign pre-tax return, Rf , is exogenously set. Thus, any change in
taxation on repatriation does not aﬀect the return on the incremental
investment opportunity. Assume that the U.S. parent faces a tax rate,
tus, a discount rate of r∗ and its foreign aﬃliate incurs a foreign tax rate
of tf . In order for the worldwide system to impose an additional cost on
foreign earnings, the U.S. tax rate must be greater than the foreign tax
rate (i.e., tus > tf). If this is not the case, then the repatriation creates
no incremental tax obligation.
So, to show the eﬀect of U.S.’s tax on capital income earned abroad,
Hartman begins by showing that, at the end of the period, a foreign
aﬃliate who received an initial capital contribution of I, will have
I(1 + Rf(1 − tf)) (3.1)
If the aﬃliate repatriated its earnings (only its earnings, so I remains
abroad) to its U.S. parent, then the parent will have
IRf(1 − tf)(1 − tus)(1 − tf) (3.2)
If the foreign aﬃliate retains the proceeds, it will have
IRf(1 − tf) (3.3)
18 Role of Taxation on Investment and Repatriation Decisions
To illustrate the loss from repatriating and then recontributing
capital back to the aﬃliate, assume that the foreign aﬃliate either repa-
triates $1 of its after-tax foreign income or reinvests the $1 overseas.
If the foreign aﬃliate repatriates the $1 to the U.S. parent, the U.S.
parent will have (1−tus)(1−tf) after repatriation taxes. However, if the for-
eign aﬃliate reinvests its earnings, it will have the entire $1. So, the
loss from “roundtripping” is equal to the diﬀerence between what the
aﬃliate earned after repatriation taxes on reinvested earnings
(1 + Rf(1 − tf))(1 − tus)(1 − tf) (3.4)
and what the aﬃliate earned assuming that it invested equity that it
previously repatriated to its parent[
(1 − tus)
(1 − tf) (1 + Rf(1 − tf)) −
(1 − tus)
(1 − tf)
]
(1 − tus)
(1 − tf) +
(1 − tus)
(1 − tf) (3.5)
Note that the second term in Equation (3.5), (1−tus)(1−tf) , represents after-
tax proceeds that were received from the parent. As such, it is a
non-taxable return of equity. Equation (3.5) simpliﬁes to
(1 − tus)
(1 − tf) (1 + Rf(1 − tf)) (3.6)
So, the loss to repatriating while simultaneously contributing capital is
the diﬀerence between Equations (3.4) and (3.6):
(1 − tus)
(1 − tf) Rf(tus − tf) (3.7)
Notice that the loss is growing in the spread between tus and tf .
When considering the role that worldwide taxation plays on foreign
direct investment, the loss from Equation (3.7) implies that ﬁrms should
ﬁnance further investments whenever possible with retained earnings.
Because the reinvestment of earnings defers taxation, ﬁrms should place
relatively less initial capital abroad preferring to fund growth with accu-
mulated earnings. This “loss” of roundtripping represents the reduction
in the initial capital contribution as compared to I. By setting the repa-
triation after reinvestment equal to the repatriation after roundtrip-
ping, one can see that the tax cost of repatriation eﬀectively reduces
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the amount of the contributed capital needed to invest:
I =
1 + Rf(1 − tus)
1 + Rf(1 − tf) < 1 (3.8)
So, the incremental tax on repatriations eﬀectively reduces the amount
of initial capital contributed by the parent into the foreign aﬃliate.
The parent is better oﬀ reducing the initial capital contribution and
allowing the remainder of the investment to be funded through accu-
mulated earnings. Hence, it is not clear that the worldwide system of
taxation automatically results in greater capital investment abroad (see
Boskin and Gale, 1987). Sinn (1991, 1993) and Hartman (1985) pro-
vide comprehensive analyses of this issue. They show the larger the
initial capital contribution, the sooner the repatriations may begin.
Overall, it is important to remember that the above analysis pertains
only to immature ﬁrms who lack adequate capital to fully fund their
investment.
3.1.2 Empirical Evidence of the Role
of Taxation on Investment
Several papers ﬁnd evidence consistent with U.S. ﬁrms’ location deci-
sions being sensitive to tax rates.2 In general, these studies document
a negative association between a country’s tax rate and the level of
foreign investment (i.e., the elasticity of foreign direct investment to a
country’s tax rate). These studies focus on investment from retained
earnings to investigate the role of taxation because it is presumed that
investment ﬁnanced by new equity is discouraged by anticipated repa-
triation taxes (i.e., the Hartman (1985) result from Section 3.1.1).
Hartman (1981, 1984) and Boskin and Gale (1987) ﬁnd that for-
eign direct investment (both U.S. ﬁrms investing abroad and foreign
ﬁrms investing in the U.S.) is sensitive to domestic tax policy. Because
U.S. tax policy reduces the returns to investment, higher U.S tax
rates lead U.S. and foreign ﬁrms to invest less in the U.S. and rela-
tively more abroad.3 Note that these results are not contrary to the
2Note that the majority of the empirical literature focuses on the investment decisions of
all ﬁrms regardless of maturity level.
3See also Slemrod (1990) and Jun (1990).
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Hartman (1985) ﬁndings as they are studying the relative proportion
of investment between foreign and domestic jurisdictions rather than
the relative amount of capital required for incremental foreign invest-
ment. In a more direct test of Hartman (1985), Hines (1994) ﬁnds that
the worldwide system of taxation not only leads MNCs to reduce their
initial capital infusions into foreign aﬃliates but that it also leads to
substantial amounts of debt to be located in foreign aﬃliates.4
Using 1982 Bureau of Economic analysis data, Grubert and Mutti
(1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) both regress capital investment in
foreign aﬃliates on a measure of foreign tax rates. Consistent with
high levels of earnings reinvestment, their ﬁndings suggest that lower
foreign tax rates lead to increased investment in U.S.-controlled foreign
aﬃliates. Grubert and Mutti (2000) and Altshuler et al. (2001) both
study tax return data for the 10 years between 1982 and 1992 and
ﬁnd that U.S. multinational ﬁrms’ investment sensitivity to foreign
jurisdiction taxes increased over this period. The authors conjecture
that their results are consistent with increasing international capital
mobility.
In terms of non-U.S. analyses of foreign direct investment, Devereux
and Freeman (1995) extend Slemrod’s (1990) analysis to seven
additional countries and ﬁnd that the spread between the various pairs
of home and source country tax rates aﬀects foreign direct investment.
As the EU explores tax harmonization, several papers have begun
exploring whether worldwide versus territorial systems of taxation lead
to erosion of the corporate tax base (see Gropp and Kostial, 2000; De
Mooij and Ederveen, 2003; Barrios et al., 2009).
Two additional studies merit mention in the discussion of foreign
direct investment. Kemsley (1998) investigates whether U.S. MNCs
ratio of export activity to foreign production (i.e., domestic investment
to foreign direct investment) varies by the tax incentives. He ﬁnds that
U.S. ﬁrms increase export sales when selling to customers in high tax
jurisdictions and that U.S. ﬁrms became more sensitive to foreign tax
rates after TRA 1986 reduced U.S. tax rates; results consistent with
4De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) provide a nice summary of the elasticities of investment to
taxation documented by various studies.
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taxes aﬀecting investment. Wilson (1993) uses a ﬁeld study at nine U.S.
multinational ﬁrms to investigate the role of taxation of ﬁrms’ produc-
tion location decisions. Interestingly, he documents that tax concerns
are only of primary importance when other non-tax considerations,
such as infrastructure, are small. Overall, the literature provides clear
support for an association between taxes and capital investment.
3.2 Repatriation
Various opponents of current tax policy argue that the U.S. interna-
tional tax system has a negative eﬀect on the competitiveness of U.S.
ﬁrms and creates incentives for multinational ﬁrms to “park” foreign
aﬃliate proﬁts overseas. In a June 2007 speech, Treasury Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy, Eric Solomon, called our current tax sys-
tem “a blend of full inclusion and territorial systems”, whereby MNCs
can defer U.S. tax on earnings of foreign aﬃliates until the earnings
are repatriated (“repatriations”) to the U.S. As of 2010, MNCs held
an estimated $1.3 trillion abroad (Zion et al., 2011), which suggests a
growth of 32% from 2008 levels (Zion et al., 2010). As a result, there is
enormous interest in the role of the U.S. tax system in dislodging these
large pools of undistributed foreign earnings from abroad.
3.2.1 Theory of Repatriation
Once an MNC reaches maturity, which is deﬁned as having adequate
accumulated earnings to fund investment, the MNC shifts its focus from
identifying the marginal source of investment (i.e., either accumulated
earnings or capital contributions) to whether it should repatriate any
accumulated earnings or not. Hartman’s (1985) insight on repatria-
tions was that, since the repatriation tax is unavoidable, it reduces the
opportunity cost of investment and the return to investment by the
same amount. As a result, the tax does not aﬀect a mature aﬃliate’s
choice between reinvesting its foreign earnings and repatriating funds
to its U.S. parent.5
5Hartman’s analysis is essentially an application of the “new view” or “tax capitaliza-
tion view” of dividends taxation put forward by King (1977), Auerbach (1979), and
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Continuing from (3.1) above, I assume that foreign and domestic
risk-adjusted after-tax returns, rf and rus, are exogenous and constant
over time.6 So, if a ﬁrm invests an amount, I, overseas, the investment
yields the following accumulation after n periods:
I(1 + rf)n − 1 (3.1*)
For an MNC with foreign earnings on an existing foreign investment,
the repatriation decision requires a comparison of the after-all-taxes
returns to reinvesting the foreign earnings abroad and repatriating to
the U.S. Allow EP to represent the cumulative amount of foreign earn-
ings that are reinvested abroad (Equation (3.1*)) and assume that for-
eign and domestic tax rates and after-tax returns are constant over
time. If a ﬁrm repatriates at the beginning of the period and then
invests the amount available after taxes in the U.S. for one period, at
the end of the period the ﬁrm has (assuming a one period model):
EP(1 + rus) − EP(1 − tf)(tus − tf)(1 + rus) =
EP(1 − tus)
(1 − tf) (1 + rus)
(3.9)
where tus > tf .
If instead the ﬁrm leaves the earnings abroad and then repatriates
after one period it has:
EP(1 + rf) − EP(1 + rf)(1 − tf) (tus − tf) =
EP(1 − tus)
(1 − tf) (1 + rf) (3.10)
A ﬁrm will repatriate at the beginning of the period when (3.9)>
(3.10).7 In a one period model, this relation simpliﬁes to rus > rf , thus
illustrating Hartman’s insight that ﬁrms will repatriate foreign earnings
when the domestic after-tax rate of return exceeds the foreign after-
local-tax return, and the U.S. tax on repatriations does not inﬂuence
the repatriation decision.
Bradford (1981). The new view holds that taxes on dividends (if constant over time)
have no distortionary eﬀects on the real investment decisions of domestic corporations.
6So rf = Rf(1 − tf) and rus = Rus(1 − tus).
7 In Equations (3.9) and (3.10) EP is grossed up by the foreign tax rate because U.S. ﬁrms
pay U.S. taxes on the pre-tax income.
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3.2.2 Empirical Evidence of the Role
of Taxation on Repatriation
Contradicting Hartman’s theoretical result, numerous empirical studies
have found evidence that repatriations are sensitive to tax rates. Kopits
(1972) ﬁnds that repatriations from U.S. controlled CFCs are positively
(negatively) related to foreign (U.S.) income tax rates consistent with
repatriation taxes deterring dividend remittances. Kopits’ results have
been conﬁrmed over the years using a variety of time periods and data
sources.8 This body of work consistently documents an inverse rela-
tionship between repatriations and the estimated U.S. repatriation tax
burden.9
One of the predominant criticisms of the Hartman model is that
multinational ﬁrms can tax plan in a manner that creates intertemporal
variation in tax rates.10 Several theoretical papers relax the assumption
of constant tax rates by considering the two diﬀerent manners in which
the repatriation tax can vary: (1) diﬀerences in the deﬁnitions of taxable
income between the U.S. and foreign jurisdictions and (2) variation in
whether the ﬁrm’s foreign tax credit position is one of excess credit or
excess limitation. Hines (1994) and Leechor and Mintz (1993) both
allow the repatriation tax to be endogenous to investment. These
8Mutti (1981) found signiﬁcant tax eﬀects associated with dividend repatriations using
1972 U.S. tax return data. Hines and Hubbard (1990) and Goodspeed and Frisch (1989)
also found evidence of a negative association between tax rates and dividend repatriations
using 1984 tax return data. Using microdata from 1986 tax returns, Altshuler and Newlon
(1993) develop a more reﬁned measure of the tax cost of repatriation and ﬁnd that that it is
negatively associated with repatriations. Desai et al. (2001, 2007) use Bureau of Economic
Analysis microdata data (Desai et al. (2001) study Bureau of Economic Analysis data from
1982 to 1997 whereas Desai et al. (2007) study Bureau of Economic Analysis data from
1982 to 2002) to study the role of taxation on repatriations and ﬁnd that repatriations vary
inversely with the tax rate of the foreign aﬃliate. In addition, because aﬃliates organized
as branches instead of corporations are taxed immediately, Desai et al. (2001) ﬁnd that
repatriations from corporate aﬃliates are more sensitive to foreign tax rates than branch
aﬃliates.
9As an interesting aside, Power and Silverstein (2007) document the counterintuitive result
that U.S. parents in loss situations are less likely to repatriate than proﬁtable ﬁrms.
Because repatriation converts domestic net operating losses, which are carried forward
for 20 years, into foreign tax credits, which are carried forward for only 10 years, the
repatriation by a loss parent decreases the likelihood that the tax attribute will be utilized
before expiration.
10Recall that the Hartman analysis only applied to investment in mature ﬁrms facing
constant tax rates.
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papers point out that because the U.S. and foreign jurisdictions cal-
culate taxable income in diﬀerent manners, repatriation taxes are a
function of the ratio of the U.S. deﬁned taxable income to the foreign
deﬁned taxable income. As this ratio may vary over time, investment
incentives could be inﬂuenced by the repatriation tax. In these models,
the Hartman result holds only when the ratio of U.S. deﬁned taxable
income to the foreign deﬁned taxable income is constant over time.
Altshuler and Fulghieri (1994) develops a model in which the U.S. par-
ent’s tax rate varies over time as it moves into and out of the excess
foreign tax credit position. In this model, repatriation tax irrelevance
only holds when the MNC’s foreign tax credit position is stationary.
Altshuler et al. (1995) (ANR) points out that none of the studies of
the association between repatriations and taxes described above have
“departed from the Hartman result: the level of the repatriation tax
does not by itself aﬀect the incentive to repatriate income rather than
reinvest it”. Each of these papers study aggregate repatriations which
includes ﬁrm-created intertemporal variation in the repatriation taxes.
To the extent that MNCs tax plan, they have the opportunity to limit
repatriations to periods when repatriation tax rates are relatively low.
If Hartman’s predictions are correct, then the failure to distinguish
between the eﬀects of permanent and transitory variation in the repa-
triation tax obligation could confound results. Most studies presume
that all variation in repatriation taxes is permanent thereby mixing
ﬁrm reactions to transitory changes in tax rates with permanent
changes in tax rates.
ANR explains that ﬁrms often can temporarily reduce their poten-
tial repatriation tax burden through FTC cross-crediting (both across
time and jurisdictions). Recognizing that Hartman’s theoretical analy-
sis only pertains to permanent tax rates, ANR speciﬁcally tests whether
repatriations are sensitive to permanent or transitory tax costs of
repatriation. ANR uses information about cross-country diﬀerences in
tax rates to estimate separate eﬀects for the permanent and transi-
tory components of repatriation tax burdens to investigate whether
cross-sectional variation in countries’ average tax rates is correlated
with the permanent component of repatriation taxes and not with the
transitory component. Ultimately, ANR ﬁnds that repatriations are
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(not) correlated with the transitory (permanent) component of any
repatriation tax obligation.
To date, I am unaware of any other papers that attempt to disen-
tangle the transitory from the permanent component of repatriation
tax rates in the study of the role of taxation on regular repatriations.11
Finally, Altshuler and Grubert (2003) discusses several mechanisms
that enable aﬃliates to eﬀectively repatriate funds without triggering
any repatriation tax. For example, by reinvesting earnings in passive
assets, the aﬃliate provides an asset against which the parent can
borrow. If the rate of return on the passive asset approximates the
parent’s borrowing rate, then the ﬁrm has achieved a tax-free repatri-
ation. Altshuler and Grubert (2003) then tests for and ﬁnds evidence
of U.S. MNCs reducing their repatriation tax burdens using these
methods.12
I believe that we still do not have a complete understanding of the
role of tax planning on the level of repatriations. Researchers should
continue to pursue work which helps us understand whether costly
repatriations are primarily a result of MNCs’ increased tax planning
or growth in real foreign investment. Said another way, are large repa-
triation tax obligations attributable to extensive tax planning or to
overseas expansion?
3.2.3 The Impact of the 2004 American Jobs
Creation Act on Repatriations
The 2004 American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) led to resurgence in
the interest of the role of taxation on repatriations. The AJCA is
a particularly powerful setting to investigate the role of taxation on
repatriations because it generated a clear transitory change in repa-
triation taxes. In Blouin and Krull (2009), the authors modiﬁed the
Hartman (1985) analysis to incorporate the temporary eﬀect of the
AJCA on the tax cost of repatriating and the ﬁrms’ ability to borrow.
The AJCA allowed a temporary 85% dividends received deduction for
11Notable exceptions are the studies surrounding the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004
which is discussed in Section 3.2.3.
12Drucker (2011) also provides a description of some additional techniques used by ﬁrms
to mitigate repatriation tax burdens.
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repatriations in 2005.13 They also implicitly assumed that domestic
tax rates are higher than foreign rates. Though the converse may hold,
these ﬁrms likely did not beneﬁt from the reduction in the U.S. tax
rate on repatriations. Therefore, the AJCA changed the decision to
reinvest versus repatriate because tax rates are not constant over time:
the U.S tax rate on repatriations was lower if the ﬁrm repatriated in
2005 than if the ﬁrm reinvested the proﬁts abroad and repatriates later.
Blouin and Krull (2009) lets tuso represent the U.S. tax on repatriations
that beneﬁt from the tax holiday.14 Following from the theory in Sec-
tion 3.2.1, assuming that repatriations at the beginning of the period
beneﬁt from the tax holiday, if the ﬁrm repatriates at the beginning of
the period then reinvests the after-tax amount in the U.S. at the end
of the period the ﬁrm has:
EP(1+rus) − EP(1 − tf)(tuso − tf)(1 + rus) =
EP(1 − tuso)
(1 − tf) (1 + rus)
(3.11)
where tuso < tus.
Notice that (3.11) is equivalent to (3.9) with tuso replacing tus.
13The actual terms of the AJCA are as follows. First, the AJCA limits the amount eligible
for the dividends received deduction to extraordinary dividends, deﬁned as the excess
of repatriations during the year over the average amount of repatriations during the
previous ﬁve years, excluding the highest and lowest years. All else equal, ﬁrms that have
been systematically repatriating in the past will not beneﬁt as much under the AJCA as
ﬁrms that have never repatriated. The AJCA further limits the eligible dividend amount
to the greater of (1) $500 million, (2) the earnings reported as permanently reinvested
on the last audited ﬁnancial statements ﬁled on or before June 30, 2003, or (3) if the
amount of permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) is not reported, the amount of U.S.
tax liability attributable to PRE reported in the last audited ﬁnancial statements ﬁled
on or before June 30, 2003, divided by 0.35. The Act also reduces the amount eligible
for the dividends received deduction by any increase in related-party debt incurred by
foreign subsidiaries between October 3, 2004 and the close of the tax year for which the
ﬁrm claims the dividends received deduction. Finally, the beneﬁts of the AJCA could be
utilized in 2004. Firms could choose to repatriate under the Act either during 2004 or
2005 tax years.
14The following details the explicit computation of tuso.
EP − EP
(1 − tf)
(tus − tf) +
0.85EP
(1 − tf)
(tus − tf)
= EP − 0.15EP(tus − tf)
(1 − tf)
=
EP(1 − 0.85tf − 0.15tus)
(1 − tf)
.
So, tuso = (0.85tf + 0.15tus)
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However, if the tax holiday is not available when the ﬁrm reinvests
its proﬁts in the foreign country and repatriates at the end of the period,
then the amount the ﬁrm has after repatriating to the U.S. at the end
of the period is the same as Equation (3.10), the after-all-taxes return
to reinvesting for one period then repatriating to the U.S. before the
tax holiday. The ﬁrm will repatriate at the beginning of the period as
long as (3.11)> (3.10). Therefore, the ﬁrm will repatriate immediately
taking advantage of the tax holiday when:
rus > (1 + rf)
[
(1 − tus)
(1 − tuso)
]
− 1 (3.12)
Now, suppose that the ﬁrm moves from a 1-period to an n-period invest-
ment horizon:
rus > (1 + rf)
[
(1 − tus)
(1 − tuso)
] 1
n
− 1 (3.12*)
Notice that as the period of investment increases, the relative impor-
tance of the tax beneﬁt decreases (recall, tus > tuso). As ﬁrms approach
an indeﬁnite investment horizon (n → ∞), reinvestment only depends
upon the relation of rus to rf . Therefore, unless the ﬁrm intends to repa-
triate in the near term, the tax holiday has relatively little impact on
the MNC’s repatriation decision (see Altshuler et al., 1995; Hartman,
1985; Clausing, 2005).
The preceding discussion suggests that if ﬁrms have adequate for-
eign investment opportunities, then the reduction in the repatriation
tax on foreign earnings will have no eﬀect on repatriation behavior.
However, to the extent that ﬁrms have relatively limited investment
opportunities they can beneﬁt from the AJCA. Consistent with the
eﬀects of the AJCA being temporary and ﬁrms beneﬁting from the
AJCA facing relatively few investment opportunities, Blouin and Krull
(2009) ﬁnds evidence that ﬁrms increased repatriations by over 400%.
Now, let z (where 1 ≥ z ≥ 0) represent the proportion of the over-
seas earnings that the ﬁrm plans to repatriate under the AJCA. Upon
repatriation, the ﬁrm will have:
z
[
EP(1 − tuso)
(1 − tf)
]
(1 + rus) + (1 − z)
[
EP(1 − tus)
(1 − tf) (1 + rf)
]
(3.13)
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If the ﬁrm reinvests all the earnings abroad, it will again have the
amount represented in Equation (3.10). Suppose that the ﬁrm has rein-
vested all of its cash into operations. If the ﬁrm intends to repatriate
under the AJCA, it would be required to borrow. So, Equation (3.13)
becomes (3.13*)
z
[
EP(1 − tuso)
(1 − tf)
]
(1 + rus) + (1 − z)
[
EP(1 − tus)
(1 − tf) (1 + rf)
]
− z
[
EP(1 − tus)
(1 − tf)
]
i (3.13*)
where i is the ﬁrm’s after-tax cost of borrowing.15
If (3.13*)> (3.10), then the ﬁrm should repatriate. Therefore, the
ﬁrm will remit earnings when:
rus >
[
(1 − tus)
(1 − tuso)
]
(1 + rf + i) − 1. (3.14)
Since the ﬁrm did not repatriate prior to the AJCA, when tuso was equal
to tus, we can infer that rus < rf . Because the ﬁrm did not borrow and
invest in the incremental domestic investment opportunity, we can also
infer that rus < i. Therefore, for a ﬁrm to consider repatriating under
the AJCA, the following relation must hold:
i > rus >
[
(1 − tus)
(1 − tuso)
]
rf . (3.15)
Notice that this relation implies that rus is low but not necessarily
that rf is below i. If rf > i, then the ﬁrm should not repatriate, but
should invest in the foreign country. If rf is less than i then the ﬁrm’s
EP could be “trapped” overseas. If this EP is in cash, then the ﬁrm
could face an agency problem (Jensen, 1986).
Consistent with ﬁrms eﬀectively having cash trapped abroad, Blouin
and Krull (2009) ﬁnd that repatriating ﬁrms had higher free-cash ﬂows
15Assume that i represents the ﬁrm’s after-tax cost of borrowing, that it is identical across
all countries and that the ﬁrm always has the option to use its overseas assets to secure
its borrowing. In the Blouin Krull (2009) analysis, the authors also assume the cost of
borrowing, i, is exogenous, i.e., that i is not dependent upon whether the incremental
investment project is situated in the U.S. or abroad. Furthermore, i is set independent
of the shift in ﬁrms’ capital structure that results from the borrowing. See Hines (1994)
for a full equilibrium model of foreign investment that incorporates capital structure.
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and lower investment opportunities. If ﬁrms do repatriate under the
AJCA, then their theory suggests that these ﬁrms have excess cash and
that the cost of repatriation under U.S. tax laws in eﬀect before the
AJCA exceeded the cost of over-investment. Firms that beneﬁt from
the AJCA chose not to repatriate before the AJCA because domes-
tic investment opportunities were limited (rus ≤ rf), so repatriation of
foreign funds does not eliminate the over-investment problem. When a
ﬁrm’s capital exceeds its investment opportunities, it can either retain
the excess cash or distribute it to its shareholders. Because ﬁrms can
mitigate the agency costs of free-cash ﬂow by distributing excess cash
to shareholders, Blouin and Krull (2009) investigate and ﬁnd evidence
that repatriating ﬁrms abnormally increase share repurchases in the
post-ACJA period.
Ultimately, Blouin and Krull (2009) documents that, after control-
ling for other predictors of repurchases, repatriating ﬁrms increase share
repurchases during 2005 by $60.85 billion more than non-repatriating
ﬁrms.16 This increase represents 20.9 percent of the total amount of
repatriations under the AJCA reported by their sample ﬁrms ($291.6
billion). They ﬁnd evidence that, in spite of having plans to invest
in approved activities (which were required under the provisions of
the AJCA), repatriating ﬁrms signiﬁcantly increase payments to share-
holders, and that the amount of this increase is related to the amount
of repatriation. Although these results suggest that ﬁrms are using
repatriated funds for a non-permitted purpose, the AJCA does not
require a direct tracing of the use of funds.17 Due to the fungible nature
of cash, ﬁrms could have made the investments stated in their reinvest-
ment plan, but then used other freed up funds for share repurchases.
Though this may deviate from the intention of the AJCA, these ﬁrms
are putting overseas proﬁts back into the U.S. economy — just not
16The mean increase in aﬀected ﬁrms is 0.277 percent of assets per quarter and the cumu-
lative assets for the aﬀected ﬁrms is $5.492 trillion.
17The Act only speciﬁcally disallows using repatriated funds for executive compensation
and does not require ﬁrms to demonstrate that repatriated funds are used for the pur-
pose stated in the approved plan. However, subsequent guidance issued by the IRS, Notice
2005–2010, lists dividends, share repurchases, tax payments, and purchases of debt instru-
ments or a less-than-ten percent interest in a business entity as additional non-permitted
uses.
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in the manner that Congress intended. Whether distribution to share-
holders is the preferred way to put the funds into the U.S. economy is
the subject to debate. Nonetheless, the Blouin and Krull (2009) results
provide useful information about how ﬁrms respond to a temporary tax
holiday. Using Bureau of Economic Analysis data, Dharmapala et al.
(2011) conﬁrms the Blouin and Krull’s (2009) ﬁndings.18,19
3.2.4 The Role of the Foreign Tax Credit on Repatriations
In this section, I discuss the details of the foreign tax credit (FTC)
calculation used in the analyses in the previous sections. Much of
the theoretical analysis above assumes that MNCs’ home country tax
rates exceed those in the source country. For U.S. MNCs, this sug-
gests that ﬁrms are in an excess limitation position (i.e., tus > tf).
Since U.S. corporate income tax rates are among the highest in the
world (see Figure 3.2), this is likely a reasonable assumption. However,
Figure 3.2 shows that the weighted average tax rate of the non-U.S.
OECD countries exceeded the U.S. statutory tax rate until 1999.
In order to derive the real tax cost of repatriations under a
worldwide system, one needs to consider the interplay of the U.S.’s
calculation of the foreign tax credit with the tax policies of the source
countries. In the preceding analysis, I presumed that the tax cost of
repatriation was simply the spread between the U.S. tax rate and the
source country’s tax rate. In reality, the computation is far more com-
plex as withholding taxes and variation in the deﬁnitions of taxable
income complicates the FTC calculation.20 Notice that the tax cost of
remitting income through dividend payments depends not only on the
18Note that Dharmapala et al. (2011) concludes that a far greater proportion of the AJCA
repatriations were distributed to shareholders as either repurchases or dividends. How-
ever, it is important to recognize that their research design prevents a direct comparison to
Blouin and Krull (2009) of the magnitude of the incremental AJCA-related repurchases.
19Brennan (2011) and Faulkender and Petersen (2011) argue that there is little evidence
that repatriating ﬁrms increased repurchases. Rather, these papers argue that they pro-
vide evidence that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms took advantage of the AJCA to repatriate
and invest domestically. I look forward to work that reconciles this work to the Blouin and
Krull’s (2009) and the Dharmapala et al. (2011) results. See also Albring et al. (2011).
20 I only discuss the worldwide system of dividend taxation whereby dividends are taxed
by the source jurisdiction and then again by the parent’s home country. Split-rate and
imputation systems are used by other countries. Essentially, these systems eﬀectively tax
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Fig. 3.2 U.S. versus non-U.S. OECD countries’ statutory tax rates. Data for this Figure
was obtained from the OECD website. The Weighted Average Tax Rate was weighted by
2009 GDP.
tax rates but also on the source country’s system for taxing corporate
income.21
As explained in Altshuler and Newlon (1993), under a worldwide
system, the U.S. taxes the dividend only when it crosses into the U.S.
The only incremental foreign jurisdiction tax is any withholding taxes
required as the dividend leaves the source country. So, the total foreign
tax (tf) is:
tf = tsfRfus + [(1 − tsf)Rf ]wf (3.16)
where tsf is the applicable statutory foreign income tax rate, Rfus is
the foreign aﬃliate’s pre-tax rate of return deﬁned using U.S. tax law,
Rf is the foreign aﬃliate’s pre-tax rate of return based on the source
country’s laws and wf is the applicable withholding rate on dividend
distributions. As discussed above, the aggregate taxes paid on any div-
idend is the sum of the direct and deemed paid taxes. So, the ﬁrst term
distributed income at a rate lower than retained income. See Altshuler and Newlon (1993)
for more details.
21Recall from Section 2 that the FTC is calculated based on the U.S.’s deﬁnition of taxable
income thereby potentially undermining the source country’s tax policies.
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in (3.16), tsfRf , represents the deemed paid dividend and the second
term of (3.16) represents the withholding tax on any dividends remitted
into the U.S. (i.e., the direct taxes paid).
If the U.S. parent is in an excess credit position (so, tsusRfus < tf),
there is eﬀectively no repatriation tax. So, tus ≤ 0. On the other hand,
if the parent is in excess limitation (as presumed due to the relatively
high U.S. statutory tax rate), then the U.S. tax liability attributable
to the dividend payment is:
tus = (tsus − tsf)Rfus − (1 − tsf)Rfwf . (3.17)
where tsus is the statutory U.S. tax rate. Note that (3.17) could be
negative if tsf > tsus,wf > (tsus − tsf)Rfus/(1 − tsf)Rf or Rfus > (1 − tsf)
Rfwf/(tsus − tsf ). If any of these situations occur, then the repatriation
creates excess credits that are available to either oﬀset repatriations
from other jurisdictions (cross-crediting) or available to carryback or
carryforward to other periods. Notice that the total tax price, tt, of a
dividend remittance is tt = tus + (1 − tsf)Rfwf .
If the parent is in excess credit, then the only taxes due at remit-
tance are the withholding taxes on the dividend, tt = (1 − tsf)Rfwf .
The tax cost of the incremental dollar of dividend is then dtt/d(1 − tsf)
Rf = wf . If the parent is in excess limitation, the total tax eﬀect of an
additional dollar of dividend is (tsus − tsf)/(1 − tsf).
So, when considering the role of taxation on repatriations, it is crit-
ical to consider the aggregate worldwide FTC position of the ﬁrm.
Although U.S. tax rates do exceed current rate in most jurisdictions,
as Figure 3.2 illustrates, this was not always the case. Since FTCs
attach to the aggregate earnings pool of a foreign aﬃliate, it is possible
that the FTC on past earnings could result in a ﬁrm being in an excess
credit position and, therefore, relatively less sensitive to the current
spread between U.S. and foreign tax rates.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that ﬁrms engage in signiﬁcant tax
planning in order to maximize the FTCs associated with repatriations
(i.e., FTC accelerators). Legislation in 2010 speciﬁcally attacks these
transactions. To date, we have little evidence regarding the impact
that these transactions have on MNC investment and/or repatria-
tion behavior. Almost all research presumes that U.S. repatriation tax
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liabilities are simply the spread between U.S. and foreign tax rates.
Work that analyzes taxable income diﬀerences could provide insights
into MNCs’ true foreign income tax positions. Interestingly, Kleinbard
(2011) argues that MNCs’ clamoring for an additional tax holiday is
the result of their opportunities for relatively inexpensive repatriations
are becoming more limited.
3.2.5 Non-dividend Repatriations
There are other mechanisms by which aﬃliates can eﬀectively repatri-
ate their earnings. Grubert (1998) discusses that, in addition to div-
idend remittances, ﬁrms also have the option to distribute income in
the form of royalties, rents and interest. These alternate tax-deductible
distribution mechanisms can result in an aggregate tax liability of
(tus − tf).22 Hence, U.S. MNCs generally prefer that remittances from
high-tax-rate-domiciled aﬃliates are in some tax-deductible form rather
than paid as a dividend.
Notice that if tus > tf , then the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between paying
interest (which is tax-deductible) or dividends between its parent and
aﬃliate. However, consider the situation when tf > tus. In this case, the
ﬁrm is better oﬀ paying interest between the parent and the aﬃliate
because the interest permanently reduces the aggregate tax burden.
The ﬁrm shields tf and only pays tus. If a $1 was paid as a dividend,
there is no tf savings. The tf provides a credit against any repatriation
taxes but if the ﬁrm is in an excess FTC limit position then there is
little current value to the incremental credit.
However, the withholding tax rates on the tax-deductible remit-
tances may be substantially higher than the withholding rates on div-
idends. If this is the case, then a U.S. MNC’s incentive to move away
from dividend remittances from high-tax aﬃliates is attenuated.
Several studies oﬀer evidence that the use of alternatives to
dividends, such as interest and royalty payments, is also sensitive to
the tax cost of repatriation. Hines and Hubbard (1990) ﬁnd that the
average foreign tax rate paid by aﬃliates remitting nonzero interest to
22Note that tus and tf now represent MNCs’ marginal tax rates on U.S., and foreign income,
respectively.
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their U.S. parents in 1984 exceeds the average foreign tax rate paid
by aﬃliates with no interest payments, while the reverse pattern holds
for dividend payments. Using 1990 IRS data, Grubert (1998) estimates
separate equations for dividend, interest, and royalty payments made
by roughly 3,500 foreign aﬃliates to U.S. parents, ﬁnding that high
corporate tax rates in countries in which U.S. MNC’s aﬃliates are
located are correlated with higher interest payments and lower div-
idend payout rates.23 Desai et al. (2004) report that, within groups
of aﬃliates controlled by the same U.S. parents, debt levels are sig-
niﬁcantly higher among aﬃliates located in countries with higher tax
rates. Note that these non-dividend remittances are often used as a
mechanism to income shift (see Section 4).
3.3 An Aside on Havens
Many argue that U.S. MNCs are transferring too much income into
tax havens (see Drucker, 2011). Hines and Rice (1994) documents that
havens hold a disproportionate amount of foreign direct investment and
proﬁts of U.S. MNCs. Hines (1996) reports that major tax havens have
less than 1% of the world’s population but have 5.3% (8.4%) of the
employees (property, plant and equipment) of U.S. MNCs.24 However,
the crux of the debate is whether havens are stripping revenue from
the U.S. In order to answer this question, it ﬁrst must be determined
whether investment in the haven is a complement or a substitute of
domestic investment.
Evidence discussed above in Section 3.1.2 suggests that investment
is highly sensitive to local tax rates. Yet, U.S. MNCs are typically not
building manufacturing facilities in haven jurisdictions.25 Rather, ﬁrms
appear to use haven operations to move proﬁts from relatively high-tax
foreign jurisdictions into the low-tax havens (see Drucker, 2011 for an
example). Notice that by moving foreign proﬁts into lower tax jurisdic-
tions, U.S. MNCs are actually increasing their potential repatriation
23Hines (1994, 1995) also provides evidence of ﬁrms’ use of interest as an alternative repa-
triation mechanism.
24Desai et al. (2006) ﬁnd that foreign aﬃliates whose parent companies have nearby tax
haven operations pay lower taxes as a fraction of sales than do other aﬃliates.
25This is not necessarily the case with Ireland.
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tax liability (recall that the U.S. receives a tax payment of roughly
the spread between tus and tf). So the negative impact of havens on
U.S. revenue is indirect because as the incremental repatriation tax
burden increases ﬁrms may be less reluctant to repatriate (e.g., Desai
et al., 2007). To date, there is no consensus as to whether havens are
detrimental to U.S. welfare.
Notice that MNCs in territorial tax regimes have a greater incen-
tive to use havens because much of the haven-induced tax savings is
permanent (i.e., there is no incremental repatriation tax burden). So,
in addition to quantifying the aggregate eﬀects of havens on MNC tax
burdens, an interesting avenue for future work would be analyses which
consider whether there is a disproportionate use of havens by MNCs in
territorial tax regimes relative to MNCs facing a worldwide system of
taxation.
4
Income Shifting/Transfer Pricing
The complexities of multinational taxation arise because a ﬁrm does
business in multiple jurisdictions where there may be no similar unre-
lated (or arms’ length) economic activity. For example, an MNC may
manufacture a consumer product which is designed in one country,
from components which are procured in a number of other countries.
These components may then be assembled into a ﬁnished product in
yet some other country, perhaps chosen for its proximity to the markets
for the product. The distribution and sales of the product may take
place from within the countries which represent the markets for the
product, or alternatively may take place from outside the majority of
countries concerned. Where an MNC or its aﬃliates undertake a range
of activities in diﬀerent tax jurisdictions, it is necessary to determine
the price at which goods and services are charged between companies
with the group; i.e., the transfer prices. Whereas transactions between
unrelated parties will generally be at arm’s length and, hence, reﬂect
market prices, transfer pricing within a group will inevitably be some-
what artiﬁcial, as it is not subject to arm’s length market forces.
Sometimes there may not even be a market outside the group for
goods or services which are sold intra-group. However, in accordance
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with fundamental tax and accounting principles, these transfer prices
should be based on the arm’s length principle. Such transfer prices
are essential to enable each entity in the consolidated group to report
economic activity under the relevant conventions in the foreign jurisdic-
tions in which they operate. The accounting for this business activity
forms the basis for determining and assessing tax liabilities. The inher-
ent artiﬁciality of transfer prices has led tax authorities to suspect that
they are set at levels designed to minimize taxes.
The example of the multinational manufacturer discussed above
could occur where a highly sophisticated and complex component,
which was manufactured in a high-tax country, was sold intra-group
at a relatively low proﬁt with a disproportionate proﬁt accruing in the
low-tax country in which assembly took place. This could be justiﬁed
on the basis that assembly, as the ﬁnal stage of the production process,
creates the ﬁnished product which should attract a large share of the
overall proﬁt. Alternatively, it could be argued that the production of
the sophisticated and complex component should attract a larger share
of the proﬁt because of its technical complexity.
When ﬁrms have a presence in high-tax jurisdictions, they may have
an incentive to divert proﬁts by fragmenting an activity or transaction
into various constituent elements to which only limited proﬁts can be
attributed. Modern commercial and industrial activity occurring across
borders provides MNCs with substantial tax planning opportunities.
Transfers of intangible assets, for example, have become a very eﬀective
way to shift income between jurisdictions. This migration of intangibles
often results in precipitous reductions in MNC tax obligations.1
Income shifting is the concept that multinational companies have
the ability to adjust the location of their proﬁts. As discussed in
Section 3, the deductibility of interest makes its attractive to use debt to
ﬁnance foreign aﬃliates in high-tax jurisdictions and equity to ﬁnance
aﬃliates in low-tax jurisdictions. Transfer pricing is eﬀectively a special
category of income shifting.
1As an example, see the reduction in Google’s eﬀective tax rate in the 2004–2006 period
which resulted from the movement of Google’s European licensing rights from the U.S. to
Ireland. See Joint Committee on Taxation (2010) for an additional discussion of intangible
issues.
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4.1 Theory
The immediate tax savings of income shifting is clear. By shifting
from a high-tax jurisdiction (i.e., thf =tax rate in a high-tax foreign
jurisdiction) to a relatively low-tax jurisdiction (tax rate= tlf) the ﬁrm
currently saves (thf − tlf) for each dollar of income shifted. For ﬁrms
facing territorial systems, this savings is permanent. However, the value
of the savings for worldwide ﬁrms depends on several conditions. First,
if thf > tus then income shifting away from the high-tax jurisdiction is
always a dominant strategy. Although proﬁts facing thf may lead to
the creation of excess FTCs, the beneﬁt of these credits is only real-
ized (a) upon repatriation and (b) upon cross-crediting with repatri-
ations from other low-tax jurisdictions. Therefore, unless repatriation
is imminent, the ﬁrm loses the time value of money on the extra tax
payment. Second, as alluded to above, shifting income to tlf is only
beneﬁcial to the extent that the tax savings exceed the cost of shifting.
Notice that the beneﬁt of shifting to low-tax jurisdictions is mitigated
by repatriating these low-tax earnings. For an MNC in a worldwide
regime, this is because shifting to a low-tax jurisdiction only results
in the deferral of tax savings. This movement of income to low-tax
jurisdictions likely increases those taxes due upon repatriation. There-
fore, if repatriation is imminent, the relative beneﬁt of shifting is small
(i.e., just the time value of money of the tax savings less the cost of
shifting).
The theoretical literature on transfer pricing focuses on two
areas: tax planning/compliance in multinational ﬁrms and managerial/
economic incentives within the multinational ﬁrm. Early work on trans-
fer pricing examined the eﬀect of taxes on pricing and production when
a single agent is responsible for intercompany transactions (Horst, 1971;
Halperin and Srindhi, 1987; Harris and Sansing, 1998). Recent work
focuses on decoupling transfer pricing for tax and managerial report-
ing purposes (i.e., use one transfer price for tax purposes and another
for performances pay). For example, Baldenius et al. (2004) documents
that ﬁrms may not be able to jointly optimize tax planning and man-
agerial incentives with a single transfer price.
4.2 Empirical Evidence 39
4.2 Empirical Evidence
There is an enormous body of empirical research studying income
shifting. Consider that much of the work studying the role of taxation
on the choice between dividend and non-dividend remittances provides
evidence consistent with income shifting incentives. For example, Hines
and Hubbard (1990) and Grubert (1998) provide evidence of U.S.
MNCs choosing to have high tax aﬃliates pay interest instead of div-
idends, which eﬀectively shifts income out of high-tax jurisdictions to
the U.S. parent. Similar to Grubert (1998), Collins and Shackelford
(1998) also study whether dividend, interest, royalty, and manage-
ment fee payments are explained by tax incentives. Collins and Shack-
elford (1998) ﬁnd that taxes not only explain payments between for-
eign aﬃliates and their domestic parents, but also payments between
foreign aﬃliates. Grubert (2003) attempts to document the precise
mechanisms ﬁrms use to shift income by studying whether MNCs’
shifting is undertaken using royalties related to research and devel-
opment. Grubert (2003) argues that roughly half of the tax-induced
income shifting can be explained from income derived from research
and development based intangibles.
Income shifting is conjectured to be a driver of ﬁrms’ internal capital
structure. By choosing to have high tax aﬃliates pay interest instead of
dividends, MNCs eﬀectively shift income out of high-tax jurisdictions
to lower tax jurisdictions resulting in a reduction in their worldwide tax
burdens. Desai et al. (2004) and Huizinga et al. (2008) both provide
evidence that debt levels are positively related to aﬃliates’ tax rates.
Collins and Shackelford (1992), Newberry (1998) and Newberry and
Dhaliwal (2001) all investigate whether an MNC’s capital structure is
aﬀected by its global tax position. Using publicly available ﬁnancial
statement data, Collins and Shackelford (1992) and Newberry (1998)
ﬁnd that U.S. MNCs’ estimated tax cost of repatriation (i.e., the ﬁrm’s
foreign tax credit status) inﬂuences whether ﬁrms substitute equity
ﬁnancing for domestic ﬁnancing.2
2Collins and Shackelford (1992) study the 1986 Tax Act whereas Newberry (1998) studies
ﬁrms’ behavior in the 1988–1991 period.
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Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001) ﬁnds evidence that U.S. MNCs ﬁrms
locate their debt abroad when the ﬁrms’ tax cost of repatriations is
low (i.e., ﬁrm is in an excess FTC limit position). Finally, Mills and
Newberry (2004) documents that foreign-controlled U.S. corporations,
facing relatively low foreign tax rates, use signiﬁcantly more debt than
foreign-controlled U.S. corporations facing relatively high tax rates con-
sistent with these ﬁrms using interest to strip earnings out of the U.S.
As these studies illustrate, because the U.S. is a relatively high-tax
jurisdiction, U.S. MNCs typically prefer to have relatively high levels
of domestic debt. However, to mitigate the beneﬁts of such behavior,
the U.S. has adopted rules that force ﬁrms to allocate domestic interest
to worldwide operations, which results in MNCs losing the beneﬁt of
the FTC with domestic debt.3,4
Although high tax rates could be correlated with other location and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc attributes that reduce the proﬁtability of foreign invest-
ment, in equilibrium, after-tax rates of return across high and low
tax jurisdictions should be equal. Therefore, many studies investigate
whether there is a negative correlation between pretax proﬁtability and
local tax rates to infer evidence of active tax avoidance generated via
tax-motivated income shifting. Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines
and Rice (1994) analyze the aggregate reported proﬁtability of U.S.
aﬃliates in diﬀerent foreign locations in 1982 and report that high
taxes reduce the reported after-tax proﬁtability of aﬃliates. Speciﬁ-
cally, Hines (1994) documents that a one percent diﬀerence in tax rates
reduces pre-tax proﬁtability by 2.3 percent.5 More recently, Huizinga
and Laeven (2008) develop a model that not only considers income
shifting between the parent and aﬃliates but also between diﬀerent
aﬃliates. Using the model and a sample of European multinational
3 In the United States, ﬁrms are subject to earnings stripping rules under 163j.
4Note that many other jurisdictions have also implemented “thin capitalization” rules which
limit interest deductibility. A couple of author groups have begun studying the role of these
rules on internal capital structure as anecdotal evidence suggests that these rules don’t
suﬃciently constrain MNCs’ interest deductions (see Buettner et al., 2008; Blouin et al.,
2011a). Also, see Hines (2008) for a discussion of the eﬀects of interest non-deductibility
on U.S. MNCs.
5 In a related study, Collins et al. (1998) study a sample of U.S. MNCs over 1984–1992 and
ﬁnd a similar pattern of greater foreign proﬁtability among ﬁrms facing foreign tax rates
below the U.S. rate.
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ﬁrms, Huizinga and Laeven (2008) ﬁnds evidence of substantial revenue
losses by European governments due to parent/aﬃliate and aﬃliate/
aﬃliate income shifting.
Several studies have investigated income shifting by U.S. MNCs over
time. Harris (1993) and Klassen et al. (1993) both investigate whether
the 1986 Tax Act aﬀected income shifting behavior. Harris (1993) ﬁnds
that the 86 Act’s reduction in the statutory tax rate led ﬁrms to move
income into the U.S. Incremental to Harris (1993), Klassen et al. (1993)
investigates other countries’ tax rate changes in conjunction with the
U.S. tax rate decrease. Klassen et al. ﬁnds evidence that U.S. MNCs
shifted from (to) the U.S. to Europe (from Canada) in 1985 and 1986.
However, in 1987 ﬁrms began shifting to the U.S. from Europe. In
an interesting extension of Harris et al. (1993), Jacob (1996) studies
whether the cross-sectional variation in the volume of intra-ﬁrm trade
explains the link between proﬁtability in geographic segments and tax
rates. Basically, Jacob shows that ﬁrms with a greater opportunity
(or ﬂexibility) to shift income are more likely to income shift. Finally,
Klassen and Laplante (2011) documents that U.S. MNCs have increased
their income shifting between 1988 and 2009.
Another line of the income shifting research focuses more explic-
itly on documenting evidence that prices reﬂect tax motivated income
shifting — i.e., transfer pricing. Clausing (2000) studies intra-ﬁrm
trade and documents that 43% (36%) of imports (exports) in 1994 are
attributable to intra-ﬁrm trade. Consistent with transfer prices reﬂect-
ing tax incentives, she documents that the U.S. has a less favorable
trade imbalance with low-tax jurisdictions suggesting that U.S. sales
to low tax jurisdictions are underpriced and U.S. purchases from high
tax jurisdictions are overpriced.6 Swenson (2001) also takes a more
direct approach in her analysis of transfer pricing by studying customs
duties and ﬁnds that tariﬀ duties are positively associated with transfer
prices.
Note that most countries assess duties on the import of goods
into their jurisdictions. These duties can alter a ﬁrm’s transfer pricing
6Clausing (2003) extends Clausing (2000) and ﬁnds that U.S. intraﬁrm export prices are
lower and intraﬁrm import prices are higher as source country taxes decrease.
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incentives. Bernard et al. (2006) documents that ﬁrms have internal
and external prices for their goods (with internal prices typically being
lower than external prices). These authors argue that the diﬀerence,
or “wedge”, between the two prices is larger when the goods are being
sold into countries with low corporate tax rates or high import tariﬀs;
behavior consistent with tariﬀ and income tax minimization. Blouin
et al. (2011b) investigates trade-oﬀs ﬁrms make when tariﬀs and income
tax transfer pricing incentives conﬂict (e.g., high import prices increase
cost of goods sold therefore reducing income taxes but increase import
duties which are assessed on import prices). For U.S. MNCs facing
relatively high tariﬀ burdens, evidence suggests that these ﬁrms under-
take more extensive planning for tariﬀ minimization than income tax
minimization.
Finally, there are a series of papers that investigate whether foreign-
controlled U.S. companies appear to be more aggressively income shift-
ing. Grubert et al. (1993) and Mills and Newberry (2004) both study
whether foreign controlled U.S. companies pay less U.S. tax than
non-foreign controlled U.S. companies. Grubert et al. (1993) documents
that foreign-controlled U.S. ﬁrms have a lower ratio of taxable income
to assets as compared to domestic ﬁrms and that 37% of its sample
of foreign-controlled corporations report near-zero taxable income on a
persistent basis. The authors recognize that the diﬀerence between the
taxable income of foreign-controlled corporations and U.S.-controlled
corporations could be explained by purchase accounting, exchange rate
ﬂuctuations and diﬀerences in leverage ratios. Yet, even after control-
ling for such items, Grubert (2003) still ﬁnds evidence that foreign-
controlled corporations engage in signiﬁcant tax motivated transfer
pricing.
However, in his discussion of Grubert et al. (1993), MacKie–
Mason ﬁnds the eﬀect of transfer pricing on proﬁtability, which the
authors suggest accounts for up to 50% of the diﬀerence in reported
proﬁts, to be too large. Blouin et al. (2005) extends Grubert et al.
(1993) by comparing the taxable income of U.S. ﬁrms that were
acquired by foreign corporations to the taxable income of U.S. ﬁrms
acquired by domestic ﬁrms. Consistent with MacKie–Mason’s skepti-
cism of the Grubert results, Blouin et al. (2005) ﬁnds no evidence that
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foreign-acquired corporations pay signiﬁcantly diﬀerent levels of U.S.
tax than domestically-acquired corporations.
Somewhat related to the notion that multinational ﬁrms tax plan to
the detriment of the U.S. Treasury, several papers investigate whether
foreign activity reduces ﬁrms’ tax burden on domestic earnings. Collins
and Shackelford (1995) use 1982–1991 Global Vantage data to investi-
gate two questions: (1) Do U.S. multinational ﬁrms face a diﬀerent tax
burden than companies that only do business domestically? (2) Do U.S.
multinationals have diﬀerent tax burdens than multinationals incorpo-
rated in other jurisdictions (Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom)?
Ultimately, Collins and Shackelford (1995) documents that Japanese
ﬁrms face the highest domestic tax costs and that U.S. and U.K. multi-
national ﬁrms faced greater domestic tax burdens than their domestic-
only peers.7 Markle and Shackelford (2010) expands the Collins and
Shackelford (1995, 2003) analyses to 79 countries. Their results conﬁrm
that Japanese ﬁrms appear to face the highest income tax burdens.
Interestingly, Markle and Shackelford (2010) also documents that ﬁrms’
eﬀective tax rates have been steadily dropping over time. However, the
paper ﬁnds little evidence that multinational ﬁrms face greater tax
burdens than their domestic counterparts.
Harris et al. (1993) reports that the U.S. tax liabilities of U.S. MNCs
with tax haven aﬃliates are signiﬁcantly lower than those of otherwise
similar U.S. ﬁrms over the 1984–1988 period, which may be indirect
evidence of aggressive income shifting by ﬁrms with tax haven aﬃliates.
In a study similar to Harris et al. (1993), Dyreng and Lindsay (2009)
documents that U.S. multinational ﬁrms with aﬃliates located in tax
havens have a 1.5% lower eﬀective tax rates.
Finally, there is some work that is attempting to explain the policy
implications of transfer pricing. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) inves-
tigates income shifting among OECD countries. Consistent with ﬁrms
responding to cross-country tax incentives, the authors document that
over 65% of the potential revenue of a unilateral tax increase is lost due
to a decrease in the reported tax base. The Bartelsman and Beetsma
7Collins and Shackelford (2003) revisits the Collins and Shackelford (1995) ﬁndings and
adds Germany to their analysis. The paper has similar inferences as Collins and Shackelford
(1995).
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results suggest that income shifting within the OECD is so pervasive
that countries’ abilities to use tax rates to raise revenue is essentially
non-existent. Markle (2011) endeavors to understand the roll of territo-
rial and worldwide systems of taxation on ﬁrms’ transfer pricing behav-
ior. To date, it is an unanswered question as to whether MNCs facing
a worldwide regime are less incentivized to shift proﬁts because these
ﬁrms’ tax savings are merely deferred (i.e., there is eventually a repa-
triation tax), rather than permanent as is typical for MNCs domiciled
in a territorial regime. Using 2006 data, Markle (2011) ﬁnds evidence
that territorial ﬁrms undertake more income shifting than worldwide
ﬁrms. This result will certainly be of interest to U.S. policy makers
as they continue to struggle with the decision to maintain the U.S.’s
worldwide tax regime.
Overall, the literature provides a substantial body of evidence
indicative of MNC transfer pricing activity. However, we have very
little evidence about the non-tax trade-oﬀs that ﬁrms make when
considering the level of income shifting. Hence, I believe that empir-
ical work which attempts test theories put forth in papers such as
Baldenius et al. (2004) will be of interest to the academy.
5
Non-Tax Considerations
Although tax considerations are an important in ﬁrms’ choices of invest-
ment location, they are clearly second order eﬀects relative to the reason
a ﬁrm invests overseas. Said another way, a ﬁrm is not likely to move
tangible assets overseas solely for tax reasons.1 However, once the deci-
sion to go abroad has been made, taxes become a priority. Although
the focus of this review is the role of taxes on foreign direct investment,
my analysis would not be complete without some discussion of the rel-
evant non-tax considerations. After all, the limits to tax planning are
correlated with non-tax considerations.
Consider that a country’s tax regime could be correlated with the
level of its infrastructure. For manufacturing enterprises, infrastructure
requirements likely dominate any tax planning incentives. However,
this may not be the case for sales or distribution centers. Another
constraint to tax planning maybe the reluctance of ﬁrms to alter their
internal transfer pricing regime. If ﬁrms are unable to decouple tax-
related transfer pricing from managerial incentive-related transfer pric-
ing then ﬁrms may forfeit the tax savings in order to preserve its
1This is not the case, however, for highly mobile capital such as intangibles (see Drucker,
2011).
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compensation/evaluation structure. Finally, there has been some recent
work regarding the role of accounting in ﬁrms’ investment and repa-
triation decisions. In particular, researchers have been investigating
whether the accounting rules pertaining to tax obligations on future
repatriations may real ﬁrm behavior.
5.1 Non-tax Issues Related to Location Decision
For manufacturing location decisions, non-tax considerations are very
important (Wilson, 1993). Without the appropriate infrastructure, it
would be too costly to develop a manufacturing facility regardless of the
tax beneﬁts. In particular, industry, production, country and/or ﬁrm-
speciﬁc non-tax attributes likely drive much of ﬁrms’ location decisions.
Consider that country-speciﬁc attributes, such as the availability of
skilled labor, are critical in pre-production stages (e.g., research and
development or regulatory approval). However, industries facing dis-
parately high pre-production costs typically have low marginal costs
of production (e.g., high tech and pharmaceuticals) and, therefore, can
locate manufacturing in a variety of jurisdictions. Hence, at this produc-
tion phase, country-speciﬁc factors become relatively less important,
particularly as tax considerations grow in importance. High intangible
businesses are typically able to move capital and proﬁts thereby cre-
ating the opportunity for relatively aggressive income shifting activity.
Clearly ﬁrm-speciﬁc concerns (e.g., managerial incentives, coordination
issues) and/or governmental restrictions will decrease the scope of a
ﬁrm’s tax planning opportunities. Wilson (1993) ultimately ﬁnds that
governmental restrictions, rather than a ﬁrm’s internal constraints, are
the greatest inhibitor to aggressive tax planning via transfer pricing.
5.2 Accounting Considerations
Section 3.2.1 above describes how the deferral of any applicable repatri-
ation tax burden alters MNCs’ investment decisions. However, another
interesting angle of repatriation activity is how deferral also provides
the opportunity for ﬁrms to manage the repatriation tax expense for
ﬁnancial reporting purposes. As described in Blouin et al. (2012a),
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ﬁnancial reporting rules prescribe the amount and timing of MNCs’
expense recognition in accounting earnings for the repatriation tax.
The general rule under FASB ASC 740 — Income Taxes (ASC 740)
requires MNCs to recognize a repatriation tax expense for the actual
or expected repatriation tax when earnings are generated in aﬃliates
located in low-tax countries. Consequently, when MNCs reinvest for-
eign earnings abroad, ASC 740 requires them to estimate and recognize
a repatriation tax expense in accounting earnings before the MNCs pay
the repatriation tax.
Under accrual accounting, it might seem obvious that ﬁrms ought
to accrue the anticipated repatriation taxes at the point the foreign
earnings inure to the ﬁrm. However, FASB ASC 740-30-25-17 — Indef-
inite Reversal Exception (formerly APB No. 23 and hereafter referred
to as the Indeﬁnite Reversal Exception) provides an exception to the
general rule whereby an MNC can defer recognition of any repatriation
tax expense until repatriation. In order to qualify for this exception,
the MNC must claim that the foreign earnings are indeﬁnitely rein-
vested abroad (hereafter referred to as permanently reinvested earnings
or “PRE”). Thus, the Indeﬁnite Reversal Exception introduces ﬁnan-
cial reporting consequences to reinvestment and repatriation decisions
for MNCs that routinely utilize the PRE designation on undistributed
foreign earnings.
Speciﬁcally, when an MNC reinvests foreign earnings and designates
them as PRE, it recognizes the foreign income with no corresponding
repatriation tax expense, thereby increasing accounting earnings rela-
tive to earnings when foreign earnings are either repatriated or not des-
ignated PRE. If the MNC eventually repatriates these earnings, it must
recognize the repatriation tax expense with no corresponding income,
resulting in a large decrease in earnings. As a result, the Indeﬁnite
Reversal Exception creates reporting disincentives to repatriate foreign
proﬁts incremental to tax factors documented in existing literature.
Further, if a ﬁrm uses the PRE designation regularly, even a deci-
sion to repatriate current earnings will decrease earnings relative to
prior periods. This decrease occurs because the MNC recognized for-
eign earnings but not a repatriation tax expense in those prior periods.
In contrast, an MNC that foregoes the PRE designation recognizes
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I II III
Year 1 and Year 2 Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2 
Repatriate current 
earnings
Do not repatriate 
current earnings
& do not
designate as PRE 
Repatriate current 
and prior earnings 
not previously 
designated as PRE 
Do not repatriate 
current earnings
& designate as PRE 
Repatriate current 
and prior earnings 
previously
designated as PRE 
Pre-tax
earnings
$3,000
($1,000 Foreign and 
$2,000 Domestic) 
$3,000
($1,000 Foreign and 
$2,000 Domestic) 
$3,000
($1,000 Foreign and 
$2,000 Domestic)
$3,000
($1,000 Foreign and 
$2,000 Domestic) 
$3,000
($1,000 Foreign and 
$2,000 Domestic) 
Foreign Tax 
Expense 100 100 100 100 100 
US Tax on US 
Earnings 700 700 700 700 700 
Repatriation 
Tax Expense 250 250 250 0 500 
After-tax
earnings 1,950 1,950 1,950 2,200 1,700 
Repatriation 
Tax paid 250 0 500 0 500 
Effective Tax 
Rate 35% 35% 35% 26.67% 43.33% 
Fig. 5.1 Tax and ﬁnancial reporting eﬀects of repatriation.
both foreign earnings and a repatriation tax expense in the accounting
period during which the earnings are generated, thereby separating the
reinvestment and repatriation decisions from their ﬁnancial reporting
consequences.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the interaction between tax and ﬁnancial
reporting. In scenario I, the MNC is presumed to repatriate all cur-
rent foreign earnings over a two year period. Because the MNC faces a
35% U.S. tax rate, the MNC accrues and pays a $250 repatriation tax.
The MNC’s aggregate tax expense for each year is $1,050 which is 35%
of its $3,000 of worldwide income. Scenario II illustrates the ﬁnancial
reporting implication to the MNC when it chooses not to repatriate
year 1 earnings until year 2. In addition, the MNC does not designate
any of its unremitted foreign earnings as PRE. Notice that the ﬁnancial
reporting consequences to the MNC in scenario II are identical to those
in scenario I: the MNC has accrued tax expense of $1,050 in both peri-
ods resulting in a 35% eﬀective tax rate. The key diﬀerence between the
two scenarios is that the year 1’s tax payment is deferred until period 2.
Once a ﬁrm designates foreign earnings as PRE, recognition of
the repatriation tax expense in a subsequent accounting period will
decrease earnings relative to prior periods because it must recognize the
5.2 Accounting Considerations 49
repatriation tax expense that it deferred in prior years. Thus, account-
ing expense recognition is an additional consequence of repatriation
because after-tax ﬁnancial accounting earnings decrease when ﬁrms
repatriate earnings that were previously designated as PRE. Scenario 3
illustrates this result because MNCs that designate earnings as PRE
in year 1 (Scenario III) report lower after-tax earnings in year 2 than
MNCs that did not designate earnings as PRE (Scenario II). Notice
that even if an MNC only repatriates its current earnings (Scenario I),
if the ﬁrm had regularly been designating its undistributed foreign earn-
ings as PRE (Year 1 of Scenario III), it will still face a relatively greater
aggregate tax expense in the year of the repatriation as compared to
periods when it designated all foreign earnings as PRE. Consistent with
the importance of tax expense deferral, Graham et al. (2011) report
that U.S. MNC executives rate expense deferral as an important factor
in the decision to reinvest foreign earnings.
In Blouin et al. (2012a), the authors ﬁnd evidence that U.S. MNCs’
real behavior (i.e., the decision to repatriate cash from abroad) is
aﬀected not only by the cash outﬂows attributable to repatriation
taxes but also by the ﬁnancial reporting implications of the repatria-
tion taxes. Although ﬁrms are required to disclose the magnitude of the
repatriation tax burden in the footnotes of their ﬁnancial statements
very few do. Some have argued that this is because the average
U.S. MNCs’ tax liability on repatriations is small. However, anecdotal
evidence seems inconsistent with this conjecture. First, MNCs have
lobbied extensively for an additional repatriation holiday (see Cham-
bers and Catz, 2010). If MNCs’ anticipated repatriation taxes were
inconsequential then why would MNCs incur these lobbying costs?
The level of eﬀort involved in lobbying suggests that the estimated
repatriation tax liability is fairly signiﬁcant. Second, U.S. MNCs are
borrowing domestically rather than repatriating funds abroad. In the
fall of 2010, Microsoft borrowed $4.75 billion even though it reported
$36.8 billion in cash on its balance sheet. Although Microsoft received
very favorable terms for its borrowing, the ﬁrm still incurred the costs
to secure the borrowing and is paying interest rather than the incre-
mental repatriation tax burden (see Burne, 2010). Third, U.S. MNCs
lobbied extensively to have the Indeﬁnite Reversal Exception included
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in International Reporting Standards (IFRS). While both U.S. GAAP
and IFRS allow ﬁrms to avoid recognizing the potential U.S. repa-
triation tax liability, the topic received scrutiny as part of the IASB
and FASB short-term convergence project on income taxes. In fact,
the Global Oversight Committee of the Financial Executives Institute
claims that the adoption of a non-U.S. accounting standard treatment
for unremitted earnings would have been “a disaster for U.S. compa-
nies” because U.S. tax and accounting structures are fundamentally dif-
ferent from European structures. The group successfully lobbied to the
European Roundtable to have the issue of Indeﬁnite Reversal Excep-
tion rescission removed from the Financial Accounting Standards Board
and International Accounting Standards Board convergence project.2
Once again, it seems unlikely the MNCs’ repatriation tax obligations
are immaterial given the lobbying eﬀorts and the comments of the
Financial Executives Institute.3
Also, a unique feature of the AJCA was that the Act limited the
beneﬁts of the tax holiday to the greater of $500 million or the ﬁrm’s
reported PRE in its ﬁnancial statement ﬁled on or before June 30,
2003. Interestingly, this requirement seems to have prevented some
ﬁrms’ repatriations under the terms of the AJCA (see, for example,
Caterpillar’s 2005 10-K). Because of this instance of book-tax confor-
mity (i.e., the beneﬁts of the AJCA were potentially limited based on
the ﬁnancial reporting construct of PRE), the AJCA highlighted the
notion of PRE to the public.
Much has been written about MNCs’ level of PRE subsequent to
the AJCA. Essentially, may conjecture that ﬁrms’ PRE represents
overseas cash that ﬁrms are somehow hiding from the U.S. tax author-
ities (See http://www.eﬁnancialnews.com/story/2011-06-20/us-seeks-
deals-for-foreign-cash-stash). Although some PRE is likely in cash, a
2http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Technical+committee+proﬁle:+Global+Oversight+Com-
mittee+(GOC).-a0130779987.
3MNC management may be disinclined to disclose repatriation tax obligations as Collins
et al. (2001) and Bryant–Kutcher et al. (2008) both ﬁnd evidence that the market discounts
the value of the ﬁrm for the estimated repatriation tax obligation. Consistent with PRE
designations being predicated by capital markets incentives, Krull (2004) ﬁnds that ﬁrms
designate more earnings as PRE (thereby recognizing relatively lower income tax expense)
when the ﬁrm is more likely to miss an earnings target.
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substantial amount is also likely to be invested in non-cash assets. If
PRE is not in liquid assets, then it is harder for policy makers to
argue to these unremitted proﬁts are an easy revenue source. Work by
Blouin et al. (2012b) attempts to measure where and in what type of
assets PRE is located.4 I believe that research that helps us under-
stand the role of the PRE assertion on ﬁrm liquidity will be of great
interest to many constituencies. Note that this work can potentially
provide insight on the consequences of the shift by the U.S. to a terri-
torial regime. If U.S. MNCs have reinvested earnings into assets such as
property, plant and equipment, then PRE can help us ascertain whether
companies will have to divest of hard assets in order to pay any tran-
sition taxes associated with the conversion to a territorial regime.
4Blouin et al. (2012b) ﬁnd evidence suggesting that less than a third of PRE is in cash.
6
Recent Developments in the Taxation
of U.S. Multinational Corporations
The Kennedy, Carter and, recently, the Obama administrations have
all considered or proposed repealing deferral which would subject all
unremitted foreign proﬁts to immediate U.S. taxation. However, the
repeal has never made signiﬁcant headway in the legislature. Rather,
as discussed above, Congress typically resorts to adjusting or tighten-
ing various techniques MNCs have used to either reduce any taxable
repatriations or increase the FTC attached to the repatriated earnings.
U.S. MNCs have been using mergers and acquisition transactions,
the treaty network, and complex foreign structures to artiﬁcially inﬂate
foreign source income which typically increases the creditable amount
of foreign taxes. Recent legislation eﬀectively prevents U.S. MNCs from
claiming foreign tax credits on foreign source income that is not sub-
ject to current U.S. taxation. In 2010, Congress focused on eliminating
techniques that U.S. MNCs have developed to split foreign taxes from
the foreign income on which those taxes were paid.1 In 2008, the U.S.
1For example, in Pub. L. No. 111-226, the Education, Jobs and Medicaid Assistance Act of
2010, $10 billion of revenue to cover elementary and secondary education teacher salaries
was projected to be generated by altering various rules that corporations leverage to calcu-
late their foreign tax credits and foreign-source income. These provisions attack methods
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attacked transactions that could be viewed as defacto repatriations
(e.g., Killer B, Deadly D, etc).
However, one reason that U.S. MNCs pursue aggressive tax plan-
ning is because much of their competition, non-U.S. domiciled MNCs,
faces a territorial system. U.S. MNCs often argue that because they are
unable to repatriate income to the U.S. without paying an incremental
tax that they are unable to invest as eﬃciently domestically thereby
deterring economic growth. MNCs argued that a reduction of the repa-
triation tax rate would yield beneﬁts such as increasing domestic job
opportunities (see Chambers and Catz, 2010). Others have argued that
deferral has led ﬁrms to move much of their incremental investment
abroad. Therefore, domestic job opportunities will increase if the pref-
erential treatment of foreign source income is repealed.
Opponents of deferral also believe that its repeal will lead to
increased tax revenues. However, there is substantial uncertainty in the
amount revenue that would be raised. Although in 2011 ﬁrms have over
$1.3 trillion in foreign earnings reinvested abroad, the revenue sought
to be raised may be elusive either because the tax hikes will harm U.S.
exports and jobs or because U.S. MNCs will merely alter their organi-
zational structure to avoid the tax. Also, critics argue that the repeal
of deferral may lead U.S. MNCs to sell their foreign operations to for-
eign controlled ﬁrms (Keis, 2007). If a territorial-based MNC only faces
a 10% tax rate on a foreign business’s proﬁts but a worldwide-based
MNC faces an additional 25% tax on all earnings, all else equal, the
foreign business will be more valuable to the territorial-based MNC.
This may result in the repeal of deferral driving more jobs overseas
instead of creating them domestically. Lastly, it is diﬃcult to see the
merits of raising taxes on U.S. MNCs when the U.S. needs to be taking
steps to promote competitiveness.
Interestingly, while the Obama administrate is attempting to limit
MNCs repatriation tax planning, many U.S. MNCs have been actively
that U.S. MNCs have developed to utilize the foreign tax credits to reduce their U.S. tax
without incurring any additional tax on the corresponding foreign income. See Byrnes
(2010).
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lobbying for an additional temporary reduction in repatriation taxes.2
As the theory above addresses, worldwide taxation does not impede
U.S. domestic investment. Rather it decreases the competitiveness of
the U.S. MNC as compared to its territorial-based foreign competitors.
If there were investment opportunities in the U.S., U.S. ﬁrms should be
able to borrow and invest. As there was little evidence that the AJCA
increased domestic employment, it is unlikely that any subsequent tax
holiday will have any eﬀect on domestic employment.
Regardless of which side of the debate one falls, data does suggest
that as MNCs increase foreign investment they also increase domestic
investment (Desai et al., 2005). If aggregate investment creates jobs,
then as MNCs increase employment abroad, they also increase employ-
ment domestically. But simply reducing domestic tax rates on foreign
earnings, does not necessarily directly increase domestic investment.
Recall that Blouin and Krull (2009) and Dharmapala et al. (2011) doc-
ument that the marginal use of funds repatriated under the AJCA was
share repurchases. Clearly, work that helps inform policy makers about
the ramiﬁcation of either the repeal of deferral or the impact of adop-
tion of the territorial system would be of broad interest to academics
and policy makers alike.
2See the Working to Invest Now (WIN) in America coalition: http://www.winamericaca-
mpaign.org/supporters/.
7
Conclusion
In this review, I attempt to aggregate the large body of international
tax literature in a manner that may be useful to researchers interested
in understanding the role of taxation on multinational corporate invest-
ment. Although research clearly suggests that taxes have a substantial
eﬀect on MNC investment and tax planning, the diﬀerence in welfare
consequences between territorial and worldwide systems of taxation
still is not clear. As Japan and the U.K. have recently dropped their
worldwide tax regimes in favor of a territorial system, the U.S. is the
remaining major economy still using the worldwide regime. Now, U.S.
MNCs will likely increase the pressure on the current administration
to either implement another repatriation tax holiday or, even, adopt
the territorial system. Regardless of what regime shifts U.S. ﬁrms face
in the coming years, taxes will likely continue to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
MNC behavior.
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